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1 Introduction
In this paper, by suggesting a formal representation of science based on
recent advances in logic-based Artificial Intelligence, we demonstrate how
three serious concerns around the realisation of traditional scientific real-
ism can be overcome such that traditional realism is given a new guise as
‘naturalised’. In the account of naturalised realism proposed by Ruttkamp-
Bloem (2013), science does not advance in a teleological fashion towards
‘the truth’. Instead, she suggests an epistemic definition of truth implying
that the criterion for determining (realist) stances on the status of the content
of science is the quality of evolutionary progressive interaction between the
experimental and theoretical levels of science. The success of this process
depends on the quality of available evidence. This (epistemological) anal-
ysis of science suggests a new interpretation of three well-known concerns
about traditional scientific realism, which, in its turn, contributes to a firmer
definition of naturalised realism as an epistemic realism vs. traditional meta-
physical realism. The problems at issue are:
1. Scientific realism should be able to deal with the messy issue of ‘dis-
entangling’ empirical information and general statements and laws
throughout the history of scientific investigations of a given real sys-
tem, and with the added complication of the non-uniqueness of such
disentanglements.
2. Theories should be robust in terms of the absorption of new empirical
information in order to deal with the ‘over-determination’ of theories
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by data, akin to the definition of the equivalent empirical models of
van Fraassen (1980).
3. Based on new empirical evidence, science is not prescriptive - it is
not the case that there is (or ought to be) a single ‘correct’ method
for modifying an existing theory to incorporate new evidence. At the
same time, science is constraining - there ought to be limitations on
what constitutes a rational modification to an existing theory, even
though such limitations do not necessarily prescribe a unique modifi-
cation process.
We contend that these issues can be dealt with in a formal representation
of science which is the result of applying the following tools from subareas
of Knowledge Representation to the above philosophical issues in the con-
text of scientific realism: The family of knowledge representation languages
known as Description Logics (Baader, Calvanese, McGuinness, Nardi, &
Patel-Schneider, 2007), an enrichment of the languages of Description Log-
ics via defeasible statements in the style of the preferential framework sug-
gested by by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990) for propositional logic,
and an application of the preferential interpretation of the approach to Belief
Revision proposed by by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (1985), as
applied to Description Logics (Meyer, Lee, & Booth, 2005), and extended
to account for Iterated Belief Revision. In what follows, we first give a brief
description of ‘naturalised realism’ as the version of realism supported by
our suggested treatment of the three concerns around the possibility of actu-
alising traditional scientific realism identified above. We then briefly discuss
each of these concerns in turn, showing as we move along how in each case
either Description Logics, Non-monotonic Reasoning, or Belief Revision
can positively address each of these concerns. To conclude, we show that a
single coherent framework for realism can be provided which incorporates
all three aspects discussed above.
2 Naturalised Realism
The version of realism presented here is called ‘naturalised realism’ and it
is based on the following twelve tenets.
1. Science is about an independently externally existing reality in William
James’s sense of experience “boiling over”, viz. (Chang, 2012), thus
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-in the sense of the ‘resistance’, or perhaps rather ‘reaction’, of nature
to the application of theories as proof of the existence of the outside
world.
2. Realist claims are compatible with the nature and the history of sci-
ence in the full (naturalised) sense of reflecting the processes of sci-
ence in its evaluations of the status of the content of theories.
3. The driver of scientific progress is revision (not retention) , where
retention is a special case of revision).
4. Scientific progress is not linear or convergent in the traditional sense.
5. The unit of appraisal for naturalised realism is a network of systems
of theories (not single theories), where the notion of a ‘system of the-
ories’ is close to the Kuhnian notion of a ‘disciplinary matrix’.
6. Continuity in science is a meta-issue and is methodological continu-
ity.
7. Naturalised realism is an epistemology of science (not a metaphysics).
8. The epistemological framework for naturalised realism is fallibilism.
9. The criterion for determining realist stances towards the status of the
content of science is the quality of ‘evolutionary progressive’ interac-
tion between the experimental and theoretical levels of science.
10. An epistemic account of truth as correspondence is the best account
for realism and here the account is unpacked in terms of truth-as-
method (‘method’ here in the sense of the generally acceptable way
in which scientists do research based on taking empirical evidence
seriously, in short the Peircean ‘experiental method’).
11. Relations of ‘historied’ reference are epistemological trackers of what
is revealed about nature as ‘true’ through the course of science (rather
than existential claims with regards to the ontology of reality).
12. The dichotomy of the traditional scientific realism debate is collapsed
into a continuum of realist stances towards the status of scientific the-
ories.
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The naturalised realist contends that whether realism is warranted with
regards to particular scientific content depends most heavily on the kind and
quality of evidence available for that content. Based on this, she suggests
that for the naturalised realist it makes sense to be a realist only about those
aspects of scientific investigations that demonstrate actual science-world in-
teraction, as such interaction is taken to be the source of establishing ev-
idence for science’s claims and the quality of such interaction is taken to
determine the quality of evidence available for specific scientific claims at
specific times.
This interaction is visible most importantly in the revisions science ef-
fects in its theories and experimental work as the result either of experimen-
tal feedback leading to theoretical adjustment or of theoretical adjustment
necessitating revision at the level of experimental processes. Such revision
is measured in terms of the ‘evolutionary progressiveness’ of theories. A
theory T is ‘evolutionary progressive’ at time tn if and only if:
1. it is ‘empirically (experimentally) adequate’ according to experimen-
tal practices in the area of investigation at time tn in such a way that
previous versions of theory T at time tn−1 have been adapted in sig-
nificant ways in order to effect this adequacy, AND
2. it is ‘theoretically adequate’ in the sense that theoretical descriptions
made at tn−1 have been adapted such that they describe or refer to
(read: ‘offer knowledge’ concerning) properties of observable and un-
observable entities in the scope of the theory at time tn.
The naturalised realist criterion is the degree to which the definitions of
reference and referential stability below are satisfied in a network of theo-
ries, as ‘refer’ in their context means ‘have evolutionary progressive knowl-
edge of’. Evolutionary progressive science-world interaction is captured
by epistemic relations of reference which define the context within which
a theory could be ‘true’ at a given time, and which track the development
of knowledge with regards to a particular event or phenomenon or target
system as follows:
A term t ‘refers’ to a posited entity if and only if it satisfies a ‘core
causal description’ (CCD) of ‘identifying’ properties associated with term t
such that
1. the CCD in question has been adapted to fit the current experimental
situation and thus describes properties currently thought to belong to
the postulated entity and
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-2. the properties in question are such that the posited entity plays its
putative causal role in virtue of these properties (i.e. these properties
are the causal origin of claims associated with the putative entity), cf.
(Psillos, 1999).
Note the following: Reference for the naturalised realist is an epistemic
issue and is thus viewed to be about tracking the development of knowledge
claims concerning a particular target system, phenomenon or event, rather
than about establishing the metaphysical existence of a real system, phe-
nomenon or event. If it is true that the metaphysical import of successful
theories would, in an ideal world, consist in their giving correct descriptions
of the structure of the world, viz. (J. Ladyman, 2007), then the epistemolog-
ical import of successful theories consists in their being the crystallisation
of a process or method of continuous revision and sifting claims. As proven
over and over again by the history of science, viz. for instance (Laudan,
1981) and (Chang, 2012), the former option is not viable given the nature
of science and therefore the naturalised realist suggests a new interpretation
of ‘reference’ as the epistemic mechanism through which the revision and
sifting of claims referred to above can be made concrete and can be tracked
through the history of scientific investigation.
Returning to the definition above, ‘identifying’ properties are properties
that can be described according to the current experimental situation - so
‘core’ properties are properties that have been revised, and are determined
by current evidence. The noteworthy point here is that naturalised realists
thus imply that what is ‘core’ can change, which is not a suggestion that
would sit comfortably with traditional scientific realists’ depiction of sci-
ence. Let us now consider how the naturalised realist proposes to interpret
and apply the mechanism of ‘reference’ in times of theory change:
Terms t and t′ denote ‘the same’ posited entity within the same theoreti-
cal system if and only if
1. both t and t′ each respectively satisfies a CCD of properties associ-
ated with them that has been adapted to fit the experimental situations
in which the theories containing t and t′ respectively have been for-
mulated, and;
2. the description of the properties in the CCD of t′ has been adapted
from the CCD of t, and;
3. the referents of t′ and t play the same causal role with respect to a
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certain set of phenomena in virtue of the properties described in their
respective CCD’s.
The issue is not one of identifying limiting cases of successor theories
or the parts of theories that ‘persevere’ through theory change, but rather the
possibility of finding heuristic continuity via revisions culminating in evo-
lutionary progressive theories, which, in virtue of their revision, carry on in
(heuristic/epistemic/pragmatic) continuity with their predecessor theories.
In this sense, truth is assembled as science progresses through revisions and
confirmations, and the content of what is assembled is captured or revealed
by relations of reference supervening on the evolutionary progressiveness of
theories.
Turning for a moment to the technical aspects of the definition above,
it is necessary to specify that reference is reference to the ‘same’ posited
entity within the same theoretical system, as the unit for naturalised realist
appraisal is a network of theories, i.e. the collection of all investigations
of a particular target system, phenomenon or event over time. And, in this
(broader) context, obviously it may the case that not all descriptions of the
same posited entity have been adapted from previous descriptions, as there
is the real possibility of incompatible descriptions of the same postulated
entity - e.g. Thomson, Lorentz, Bohr, Millikan, et al. on the properties of
electrons - given that the network of investigations being evaluated may in-
clude more than one (in/compatible) theoretical system focused on the par-
ticular phenomenon or event at issue (e.g. the phlogiston system of theories
vs. the oxygen system of theories). (For our purposes here, think of a sys-
tem of theories as broadly a Kuhnian paradigm in the sense of a disciplinary
matrix.) Thus the reference relations of every separate theoretical ‘genre’ or
system of theories must all be taken into account when a realist decision is
made regarding the appropriate epistemic stance to adopt towards the con-
tent of knowledge concerning a particular real system, phenomenon or event
at a given time.
In conclusion of this section, note that naturalised realism is an epis-
temic realism which means at the most simple level simply that naturalised
realists believe scientific knowledge is knowledge about the external world.
(This may or may not include the belief that the entities implied to exist
according to the sum of current scientific knowledge, really exist. The epis-
temic realist can remain agnostic to a huge degree about such metaphysical
issues.) Thus the outcome of a naturalised realist evaluation of the con-
tent of a network of theories is a particular epistemic stance towards the
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-content of such a network, on a continuum of realist stances varying from
epistemic equivalents to traditional instrumentalism to such equivalents to
traditional scientific realism (e.g. think of the development of knowledge
concerning certain viruses). This notion of a continuum captures the sense
in which naturalised realism is naturalised, i.e. realism traces the move-
ments of science, as science endeavours to understand the ‘movements’ of
real phenomena and events.
3 The Empirical-Theoretical Distinction Re-visited
Ernst Nagel (1961) offers one of the most well-known distinctions between
so-called ‘experimental laws’ and ‘proper theories’. In his sense ‘experi-
mental laws’ contain only so-called observational terms, while the purpose
of the formulation of ‘proper theories’ is to explain ‘experimental laws’ by
the theoretical terms they introduce. This is part of the old so-called ‘two-
language’ depiction of the positivist syntax of science of which Rudolf Car-
nap’s (1956) The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts is the
best exposition. This view, according to which science is interpreted by “re-
lating it to an observation language (a postulated part of natural language
which is devoid of theoretical terms)” (van Fraassen,1980, pp.13-14), has
now totally run its course. The debate over the distinction between theoreti-
cal and observational (or empirical in contemporary terms) rages on though,
albeit in different format, and one of its most interesting playing fields is the
area of scientific realism.
To see why this is so, let us briefly consider one other major contri-
bution to the debate about the viability of the two-language distinction,
namely Grover Maxwell’s (1962) The Ontological Status of Theoretical
Entities which is directly in opposition to Carnap’s views and meant to
be an attack on the instrumentalism of the positivist account of science.
Maxwell (1962, p.1052) starts off by quoting the other stalwart of posi-
tivism, namely Ernst Nagel’s (1961), statement that the distinction between
realism and instrumentalism is simply a “conflict over preferred modes of
speech” (Nagel,1961, Chapter 6). Most of what Maxwell offers in support
of realism turns on this remark of Nagel’s, as Maxwell implies that what
should be taken into account in terms of the dichotomy postulated by the
positivists is that while it must be acknowledged that the ‘life’ of a the-
oretical term often starts out as a mere “heuristic crutch” (Maxwell,1962,
p.1053), very often its life ends as an ‘observation’ term - e.g. the history
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of the discovery of ‘microbes’, viz. (Maxwell,1962, pp.1053-1055). Thus,
against van Fraassen’s definition of ‘obervable’ as “an unaided act of per-
ception” (van Fraassen,1980, p.15), Maxwell (1962, p.1056) argues for a
view that acknowledges that“. . . there is, in principle, a continuous series
[our italics] beginning with looking through a vacuum and containing these
as members: looking through a windowpane, looking through glasses, look-
ing through binoculars, looking through a low-power microscope, looking
through a high-power microscope, etc., in the order given”. He (ibid.) con-
cludes from this that accepting such a ‘continuous series’ of candidates for
possessing the characteristic of being observable, implies that there is no
“non-arbitrary line between ‘observation’ and ‘theory’ ”.
I [[The naturalised realist, while taking that ‘observable’ is not
equated with ‘existence’ as Maxwell (1962, p.1057) insists, accepts this
arbitrariness given her focus on the revisable and shifting nature of ev-
idence for current scientific theories. She proposes that Maxwell’s con-
tinuous series of observability suggests an epistemic (not a metaphysi-
cal) series reflecting a continuum of epistemic (realist) stances towards
the content of theories assembled at a given time. More specifically, as
noted above, the outcome of a naturalised realist evaluation of the con-
tent of a network of theories is a particular epistemic stance towards
the content of such a network, on a continuum of realist stances vary-
ing from epistemic equivalents to traditional instrumentalism to such
equivalents to traditional scientific realism. Epistemic positions on the
naturalised continuum thus include for instance descriptions of prop-
erties of entities which are ‘unobservable in principle’, viz. (Maxwell,
1962), e.g. it is impossible (for now) to reach the solid inner core of the
earth which is estimated to be 1,370 km deep, but descriptions of it exist
and make up explanations of the earth’s structure. On the other hand,
our knowledge of an entity (posited ‘reference’ relations) may become
more and more complex (refined) through time, e.g. the field of atomic
chemistry in the early 19th century turned not so much on belief in the
existence of atoms, as in some of the properties of atoms such as their
weights, volumes, charge, the forces atoms exert on each other, etc.,
while 21st century atomic chemistry does include or suggest belief in
the existence of atoms. And, lastly, our knowledge may be revised (‘ref-
erence’ relations may be deflated or reigned in) as scientific theories
evolve and progress, e.g. the total revision of Newtonian terms such as
‘corpuscule’. Such ‘referential oscillation’ implies that the traditional
realism / instrumentalism debate is a misguided attempt to take a global
8
-attitude towards science, when in fact both of these attitudes are reason-
able towards different parts of science at different times in the history
of science at least in so far as epistemic attitudes towards aspects of sci-
ence are concerned, and in this sense, the naturalised realist dissolves
the extremes of the traditional metaphysical debate into an epistemic
continuum of realist stances towards the status of theories.]]
The real challenge realism faces, rather than focusing on the separate
parts / stances making up the continuum, actually has to do with explaining
how such a continuum might work as a continuum, and thus to propose
a workable suggestion to deal with the arbitrariness of theory-observation
distinctions. This is where a representation of scientific knowledge based
on Description Logics can assist.
Description Logics (or DLs) are a family of knowledge representation
formalisms (Baader et al., 2007), corresponding to decidable fragments of
first-order logic. They are based on the notions of concepts (unary predi-
cates in first-order logic terms) and roles (binary relations in first-order logic
terms), and are mainly characterised by constructors that allow complex
concepts and roles to be built from atomic ones. The DLs of interest to us
are all based on an extension of the well-known DL ALC (Schmidt-Schauß
& Smolka, 1991). Concept descriptions are built from concept names using
the constructors disjunction (C unionsqD), conjunction (C uD), negation (¬C),
existential restriction (∃r.C) and value restriction (∀r.C), where C,D rep-
resent concepts and r represents a role name.
A DL knowledge base κ consists of two finite and mutually disjoint sets.
A terminology box (or TBox) which introduces the terminology, and an as-
sertion box (or ABox) which contains facts about particular objects in the
application domain. TBox statements have the form C v D (inclusions)
where C and D are (possibly complex) concept descriptions. Objects in
the ABox are referred to by a finite number of individual names and these
names may be used in two types of assertional statements: concept asser-
tions of the type C(a) and role assertions of the type r(a, b), where C is a
concept description, r is a role name, and a and b are individual names.
The semantics of ALC is the standard set-theoretic Tarskian semantics.
Individual names are interpreted as elements of a domain of interest, con-
cepts as subsets of this domain, and roles as binary relations over this do-
main. An interpretation I consists of a non-empty set ∆I (the domain of I),
an injective denotation function dwhich maps every individual name a to an
element aI of the domain ∆I , a function ·I (the interpretation function of
I) which maps every concept name A to a subset AI of ∆I , and every role
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name r to a subset rI of ∆I×∆I . The interpretation function is extended to
arbitrary concept descriptions as follows. Let C,D be concept descriptions
and r a role name, and assume that CI and DI are already defined. Then
(¬C)I = ∆I \ CI ,
(C unionsqD)I = CI ∪DI , (C uD)I = CI ∩DI ,
(∃r.C)I = {x | ∃y s.t. (x, y) ∈ rI and y ∈ CI},
(∀r.C)I = {x | ∀y, (x, y) ∈ rI implies y ∈ CI}.
An interpretation I satisfies C v D if and only if CI ⊆ DI . Similarly
for ABox assertions, an interpretation I satisfies the assertion C(a) if and
only if aI ∈ CI , and it satisfies r(a, b) if and only if (aI , bI) ∈ rI . I is
said to be a model of a DL (TBox or ABox) statement φ if and only if it
satisfies the statement. I is said to be a model of a DL knowledge base
κ if and only if it satisfies every statement in κ. A DL knowledge base κ
entails a DL statement φ, written as κ  φ, if and only if every model of
κ is a model of φ. With the formal apparatus in place, our proposal is to
represent scientific theories as Description Logic knowledge bases, with the
TBox of a knowledge base containing a description of the theory, and the
ABox containing the accumulated empirical facts.
The most relevant aspect of the structure of DL knowledge bases from
the perspective of the naturalised realist is the explicit distinction drawn be-
tween statements in the TBbox and the ABox. This dichotomy provides a
mechanism for drawing a formal distinction between theoretical and obser-
vational terms. Recall that the intended use of the ABox is the provision of
formal empirical facts about the world. It therefore stands to reason that the
concepts and roles occurring in the ABox have to be interpreted as observa-
tional terms. Put another way, within a DL knowledge base, the distinction
between theoretical and observational terms can be formally enforced by
requiring that only observational terms may be present in the ABox. Ob-
serve that the distinction between theoretical and observational terms is not
determined by the use of DLs. Rather, it merely (but importantly) provides
a framework within which a formal distinction between theoretical and ob-
servational terms can be enforced.
4 Over-Determination of Theories by Data
Imagine a typical semantic account of theories, e.g. (Suppes, 1967; van
Fraassen, 1980), according to which theories are depicted in terms of sets
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-of mathematical structures that are the models of the theory in question.
Some commentators on this school of thought, e.g. (Kuipers, 2001; Rut-
tkamp, 2002), further identify empirical reducts of the models in question
as follows. Consider what it really means to formulate a model of a par-
ticular theory. A model of a theory sees to it that every predicate of the
language of the theory has a definitive extension in the underlying domain
of the model. Now, focusing on a particular real system at issue in the con-
text of applying a theory, which in turn implies a specific empirical set-up in
terms of the measurable quantities of that particular real system, the predi-
cates in the mathematical model of the theory under consideration that may
be termed ‘empirical’ predicates may be selected. This is how an empiri-
cal reduct is formulated. Recall that a ‘reduct’ in model-theoretic terms is
created by leaving out of the language and its interpretations some of the
relations and functions originally contained in these entities. This kind of
structure thus has the same domain as the model in question but contains
only the extensions of the ‘empirical’ predicates of the model. Notice that
these extensions may be infinite since they still are the full extensions of the
predicates in question.
The method of (‘empirical’) verification of each of the set of models
depicting the theory (i.e. how well do each of them reflect/represent/link
to the relevant system in the real world?), is decided by the specific nature
of the specific model in question, as well as by the nature of the specific
real system in question. Hence if the phenomena in some real system and
the experimental data concerned with those phenomena are logically recon-
structed in terms of a mathematical structure - call it an ‘empirical’ or ‘data’
model - then the relation of empirical adequacy becomes a relation which
is an isomorphism from the empirical model into an empirical reduct of a
relevant model of the theory in question.1 To summarise: In the empirical
reduct are interpreted only the terms called ‘empirical’ in the particular rele-
vant context of application or empirical situation. Think of this substructure
of the model at issue as representing the set of all atomic sentences express-
ible in the particular empirical terminology true in the model. An empirical
model - still a mathematical structure - can be represented as a finite subset
of these sentences, and contains empirical data formulated in the relevant
language of the theory.
But what is the status of the models or empirical reducts or empirical
1Recall that according to van Fraassen (1976, p.631) a theory is empirically adequate if “all
appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures in at least one of its models”.
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models not chosen at a specific time, then? The knowledge or information
about the particular empirical model(s) in question that they carry, certainly
still is knowledge, is it not? Well, yes and no. What is needed is a formal
mechanism by which to depict choices, the motivations for choices, and the
change of both of these, should there be a change of context within which a
theory is being applied. A decision is taken to work with a certain model or
empirical reduct at a certain time, but, on the one hand, a different choice /
decision based on new information can be made at any time, or on the other
hand, what are deemed to be ‘empirical predicates’ can change according to
new knowledge and thus the formulation of empirical reducts can change.2
For instance, the general theory of relativity was formulated by Einstein (and
Hilbert) in 1915. For almost a century now physicists have been construct-
ing literally dozens of different types of models - all models of precisely
the same theory - to fit both experimental and observational data about the
space-time structure of the real universe and certain paradigmatic prefer-
ences. This illustrates (perhaps in a different way from what he (Kuhn 1996)
intended), Kuhn’s point that neither the content of science nor any system
in reality should be claimed to be “uniquely exemplified” by scientific the-
ories from the viewpoint of studies of “finished scientific achievements”. In
this sense the ‘open-endedness’ of science can be taken to imply that the
terms of an already established theory are ‘about’ an on-going potential of
entities in some system of reality to relate to some objects and relations in
any model of that theory. The actualization of this potential requires human
action in the sense of finding and finally articulating ‘satisfying’ relations
between aspects of systems in reality and certain empirical aspects (reducts)
of models of the theory at issue. And it is in the process of establishing such
relations that one becomes aware of ‘empirical proliferation’in the sense of
what we term ‘over-determination of theories by data’. In a sense this is the
reverse of the traditional scenario of the under- determination of theories by
data. 3
In what follows we claim in particular that an application of defeasible
reasoning to situations of over-determination of theories by models and data
2Cf. (Ruttkamp, 2005).
3The context of this discussion is that of empirical equivalence in Van Fraassen’s sense of
the notion: he (van Fraassen,1980, p.67) explains that if for every model M of theory T there
is a model M ′ of T ′ such that all empirical substructures of M are isomorphic to empirical
substructures of M ′, then T ′ is empirically at least as strong as T . Earlier van Fraassen
(1976, p.631) wrote that “Theories T and T ′ are empirically equivalent exactly if neither is
empirically stronger than the other. In that case ... each is empirically adequate if and only if
the other is”.
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-may enable formalising this second kind of complexity in terms of a par-
ticular kind of preferential ranking of these models.4 In this context, let us
consider the possibility of introducing into the wide empirical equivalence
debate, concentrated on issues concerning over-determination of theories by
data, the non-monotonic mechanism of defeasible reasoning, refined into a
model-theoretic non-monotonic logic (based on the preferential logics of
Lehman & Magidor (1992) and of Yoav Shoham (1987)) offering a formal
method to rank models. To enable defeasible reasoning, the language of
classical propositional logic is enriched with a notion of defeasible implica-
tion, represented with the connective |∼, with statements of the form α |∼ β
informally intended to represent the information that β normally follows
(defeasibly) from α. The intention is to exploit the ability to represent de-
feasible information in order to deal with the over-determination of theories.
Suppose, for example, that our theory contains the information that mam-
malian and avian red blood cells are vertebrate red blood cells (MRBC →
VRBC, ARBC → VRBC), that vertebrate red blood cells have a nucleus
(VRBC → hasN), but that mammalian red blood cells don’t (MRBC →
¬hasN). Notice that mammalian red blood cells, by virtue of being verte-
brate red blood cells, are also said to have a nucleus (MRBC → hasN). So
a consequence of the theory is that mammalian red blood cells have, and
don’t have a nucleus—a classical case of over-determination.
The proposal we are advancing here is that a language with defeasible
implication allows for a more appropriate and accurate expression of sci-
entific theories. In the case of the example above a more accurate theory
would be one in which it is stated that mammalian and avian red blood cells
are vertebrate red blood cells (MRBC → VRBC, ARBC → VRBC), as be-
fore, but that vertebrate red blood cells normally, but not necessarily, have
a nucleus (VRBC |∼ hasN), and that mammalian red blood cells normally
don’t (MRBC |∼ ¬hasN). Furthermore, an appropriate notion of entailment
for such a richer language would correctly identify mammalian red blood
cells as exceptional vertebrate red blood cells, therefore not conforming to
the default property of vertebrate red blood cells having a nucleus, and in
doing so, avoid any over-determination.
It turns out that suitable model-theoretic notions of entailment can be
obtained by employing a form of preferential semantics. Recall that the se-
mantics of propositional logic is based on the set of propositional valuations
V , where a valuation v is a function which assigns a truth value (true of
4Cf. (Ruttkamp, 2005).
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false) to every propositional atom from which the language is generated.
The preferential semantics for defeasible reasoning proposed by Kraus et
al. (1990) and refined by Lehmann & Magidor (1992) involves the es-
tablishment of an ordering over valuations, with valuations lower down in
the ordering viewed as more plausible. More precisely, let S be a set, the
elements of which are called states. Let ` : S 7→ V be a labelling function
mapping every state to a valuation v ∈ V . Let ≺ be a binary relation on
S. Given any classical propositional formula α, s ∈ S satisfies α (written
s |≡ α) if and only if `(s)  α, i.e., v  α, where `(s) = v. We defineJαK = {s ∈ S | s |≡ α}. JαK is smooth if and only if each s ∈ JαK is
either ≺-minimal in JαK, or there is s′ ∈ JαK such that s′ ≺ s and s′ is
≺-minimal in JαK. We say that S satisfies the smoothness condition if and
only if for every propositional formula α, JαK is smooth. Furthermore, ≺
is said to be modular if and only if there is a totally ordered set Q (with <
denoting the total order on Q) and a ranking function rk : S 7→ Q such that
for every s, s′ ∈ S, s ≺ s′ if and only if rk(s) < rk(s′). A ranked model is
then defined as a tripleR = 〈S, `,≺〉 where S is a set of states satisfying the
smoothness condition, ` is a labeling function mapping states to elements of
V , and ≺ is a modular ordering on S.
Ranked models can be used to define the semantics of classical proposi-
tional formulas, as well as defeasible implications. A formula α is satisfied
inR if and only αˆ = S. That is, if all elements of S are states that satisfy α.
More interestingly, a defeasible implication α |∼ β is satisfied in R if and
only if min≺(αˆ) ⊆ βˆ. That is, α |∼ β is satisfied in R if and only if the
≺-minimal, or most plausible, elements of αˆ are also elements of βˆ.
Lehmann & Magidor (1992) propose that rational forms of entailment
for defeasible reasoning be captured in terms of ranked models. Given a
knowledge base κ expressed in a propositional language enriched with de-
feasible implication, their proposal is that the set of formulas entailed by
κ ought to be exactly those that are satisfied in one of the ranked models
in satisfying all elements of κ. Since, for most knowledge bases κ, there
would be more than one ranked model satisfying it, there may well be more
than one appropriate form of entailment as well. A detailed investigation
into different forms of entailment is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
point is that defeasible reasoning, and more specifically, the introduction
of defeasible implication based on a preferential model-theoretic semantics,
can provide a successful formal mechanism for managing the problem of
over-determination in logic-based representation of scientific theories.
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Returning now to naturalised realism, is it a case of anything goes? All of
science is about revision after all, so are naturalised realists, realists about
all of science? The issue for the naturalised realist is not simply noting that
theories are revised in the course of science, it is about determining what
scientists learn from revision, as the naturalised realist is specifically in-
terested in revision that is ‘evolutionary progressive’. Thus the naturalised
realist suggests that scientific progress is the result of the available network
of knowledge claims becoming more refined as scientists learn from their
‘mistakes’ and adapt their theories such that they show how their theories
can accommodate revision (note that maintaining the status quo when no
revision is necessary in the face of new evidence, is recognised as a special
case of ‘revision’). Continuity lies in the method of science - thus in revi-
sion, in the epistemic sense that the quality of knowledge claims depends for
ever on the quality of evidence available at the time. In this sense perhaps
theories that have been most revised (e.g. phlogiston) are theories with the
most realist potential.
This is not in contradiction with the fact that no such thing as phlogiston
exists, because naturalised realism expands the scope of realism from being
tightly (almost exclusively) focused on metaphysical issues to allowing an
emphasis on the epistemological aspects of theory content evaluation. A
theory that can absorb revision (thus which is evolutionary progressive) is
much stronger than one that is true in all possible worlds, because an evo-
lutionary progressive theory contains much more knowledge of the system
(or phenomenon or event) it describes than a tautology does, in the sense
that it reflects knowledge of what should be left out of descriptions (based
on current evidence), while a theory that is always true does not reflect such
knowledge. Naturalised realism is first and foremost an epistemology of
science, not a metaphysics of science.
All investigations of a phenomenon or event over time inform our cur-
rent knowledge of it. The unit of (naturalised) realist appraisal is networks
of (systems of) theories, not single theories. Thus the more revision there
is, the better movements within such a network of theories can be tracked
and interpreted and the better the strength of the current realist stance to-
wards knowledge of the event or phenomenon at issue can be evaluated. We
suggest belief revision as a mechanism through which to demonstrate these
aspects of a naturalised realist definition of progress in science in terms of
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revision rather than retention.5
Generally, belief revision is concerned with the rational management of
changes to an agent’s information about the world it inhabits. More specif-
ically, it aims to describe how an agent ought to change its mind when
confronted with new, and possibly conflicting, information to be admitted
into its knowledge about the world. To incorporate belief revision into the
methodology put forward by the naturalised realist, it is best to consider the
approach to revision advanced by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson,
the so-called AGM approach (1985). Technically, AGM belief revision is
applicable to any logic with a standard Tarskian semantics for which the
Compactness Theorem holds, but we shall make matters concrete here by
focusing on propositional logic. A knowledge base in this context is rep-
resented as a set κ of propositional formulas. For the naturalised realist κ
would therefore represent a scientific theory. With the knowledge base κ
fixed, a revision operator takes as input a propositional formula to be in-
corporated into the current knowledge base and produces a new knowledge
base (a set of propositional formulas).
Perhaps the most important aspect of AGM revision in this context is
that it does not prescribe a unique method for revising a knowledge base.
Instead, it provides the following set of postulates to which any rational
revision operator should conform:
(K1) κ ◦ α = Cn(κ ◦ α)
(K2) α ∈ Cn(κ ◦ α)
(K3) Cn(κ ◦ α) ⊆ Cn(κ ∪ {α})
(K4) If κ ∪ {α} 6|= ⊥ then κ ◦ α = Cn(κ ∪ {α})
(K5) If κ ◦ α |= ⊥ then α |= ⊥
(K6) If α ≡ β then Cn(κ ◦ α) = Cn(κ ◦ β)
(K7) Cn(κ ◦ (α ∧ β)) ⊆ Cn(κ ◦ α ∪ {β})
(K8) If (κ ◦ α) ∪ {β} 6|= ⊥ then Cn((κ ◦ α) ∪ {β}) ⊆ Cn(κ ◦ (α ∧ β))
5Note that a related issue here is the case of theory change, e.g. Kepler to Newton, Newton
to Einstein, or the 18th and 19th century ether theories of light to electromagnetism. Coping
with examples of revision such as these, demand a more specific extension of vocabulary (lan-
guages) which is somewhat outside the scope of this paper, but which we address in a series of
forthcoming works.
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cussed at length (Gärdenfors, 1988), and we won’t do so here. For the nat-
uralised realist this approach to revision is important because revision need
not be unique, thereby allowing for the development of systems of theories,
all conforming to the eight AGM revision postulates. At the same time,
revision is not naïvely open-ended either. The constraints imposed by the
eight postulates are suitably restrictive, ensuring ample justification for the
maintenance of a system of theories.
AGM revision provides a formal framework for developing a system of
theories, but since it only describes a mechanism for a single revision step,
it does not address the issue of the maintenance of a network of systems of
theories. For that it is necessary to consider the area of iterated belief revi-
sion which seeks to describe the dynamics of a sequence of belief revision
steps. A detailed description of iterated revision is beyond the scope of this
paper. It will suffice here to remark that the most successful approach (Dar-
wiche & Pearl, 1997) involves an extension to AGM revision, and allows for
the construction of a network of results in line with the naturalised realist
stance.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that Description Logics can shed new light on the formal
representation of the empirical-theoretical distinction, that Non-monotonic
Logic in the form of (propositional) defeasible implication can be employed
to manage the over-determination of scientific theories, and that (proposi-
tional) Belief Revision can be used a mechanism for representing the nat-
uralised realist approach to progress in science. A single unifying frame-
work for doing so would involve the incorporation of Non-monotonic logic
and Belief Revision into Description Logics. In recent years, significant
progress has been made in this regard, with Description Logics being ex-
tended to include notions of defeasible subsumption (Giordano, Gliozzi,
Olivetti, & Pozzato, 2013) and Belief Revision (Meyer et al., 2005). What
is still missing for a truly integrated framework is a system in which Belief
Revision can be applied to Description Logics that are enriched with defea-
sible subsumption. We are currently investigating the development of such
a system.
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